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Abstract 
 
Previous electrophysiological studies have shown that attentional selection processes are 
highly sensitive to the temporal order of task-relevant visual events. When two successively 
presented colour-defined target stimuli are separated by a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
of only 10 ms, the onset latencies of N2pc components to these stimuli (which reflect their 
attentional selection) precisely match their objective temporal separation. We tested 
whether such small onset differences are accessible to conscious awareness by instructing 
participants to report the category (letter or digit) of the first of two target-colour items that 
were separated by an SOA of 10, 20, or 30 ms. Performance was at chance level for the 10 
ms SOA, demonstrating that temporal order information which is available to attentional 
control processes cannot be utilized for conscious temporal order judgments. These results 
provide new evidence that selective attention and conscious awareness are functionally 
separable, and support the hypothesis that attention and awareness operate at different 
stages of cognitive processing. 
 
Keywords: selective attention, consciousness, visual awareness, temporal order judgments, 
event-related brain potentials 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Selective attention and conscious awareness are assumed to be closely linked. 
Phenomena such as inattentional blindness (e.g., Simons, 2000) and change blindness (e.g., 
Rensink, 2002) demonstrate that the appearance of salient visual stimuli or stimulus 
changes often goes undetected when attention is directed elsewhere. Such cases suggest 
that visual events need to be selectively attended in order to become consciously 
accessible, and that attention might act as the ‘gatekeeper’ for conscious awareness. These 
intimate links between attention and awareness have led to the suggestion that these two 
domains might in fact be identical (e.g., Posner, 1994; O’Reagan & Noe, 2001): What we are 
aware of at any given moment is determined by what is currently in the focus of selective 
attention. However, other authors have argued that attention and awareness are 
functionally distinct (e.g., Lamme, 2003; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). Evidence for the 
separability of attention and awareness is provided by cases where selective attention to a 
particular stimulus does not give rise to conscious awareness (e.g., He, Cavanagh, & 
Intriligator, 1996), cases where masked invisible stimuli attract attention when their features 
match a currently active task set (e.g., Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003; Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 
2009), and cases where conscious object classification can occur in the near absence of 
attention (e.g., Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002). 
 An area in which links between attention and awareness have not yet been studied 
systematically is the processing of temporal relationships between perceptual events. It is 
well-known that sensory stimuli have to be separated by a minimum time interval in order 
to be consciously perceived as non-simultaneous or successive (Exner, 1875; Hirsh & 
Sherrick, 1961). If perceptual awareness and sensory attention are closely linked, such 
thresholds for the conscious perception of temporal order might directly reflect a fixed 
temporal resolution limit of selective attention. Sensory events are perceived as 
simultaneous when their objective temporal separation is too small to be detected by 
attentional processes. They are experienced as successive when they are separated by a 
time interval that exceeds the temporal threshold for their individuation by selective 
attention. To test this hypothesis, the temporal resolution of selective attention needs to be 
determined independently from observers’ ability to make conscious temporal order 
judgments. 
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 In a recent series of experiments (Eimer & Grubert, 2014; Grubert & Eimer, in press), 
we developed new experimental procedures to demonstrate that focal attention can be 
allocated extremely rapidly and independently to different target objects, and that the 
temporal resolution of attentional control processes is remarkably high. In the original study 
(Eimer & Grubert, 2014), two search displays with coloured alphanumerical items (digits and 
letters) were presented in rapid succession (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the stimulation 
procedures). Both displays contained a colour-defined target and a distractor object in a 
different colour on opposite sides. Participants were told that there would be one target 
item in a particular colour (e.g., red) in both displays, and that their task was to attend to 
both of these targets in order to identify them and to report whether the two target items 
belonged to the same alphanumerical category (two letters, two digits) or not (one letter 
and one digit). To determine how rapidly attention could be allocated to each of the two 
target objects when these objects appear in rapid succession, the stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) separating the two displays was varied between 10 ms and 100 ms. To perform the 
task, participants had to direct attention initially to the target object in the first display, and 
then allocate attention to the target in the second display. To track the time course of these 
two attentional processes, we measured N2pc components of the event-related potential in 
response to these objects. The N2pc is an enhanced negativity that typically emerges 180-
200 ms after stimulus onset at posterior electrodes contralateral to the visual field of a 
target object in multi-stimulus visual displays, and reflects the attentional selection of 
candidate target objects among distractors in visual search (e.g., Luck & Hillyard, 1994; 
Eimer, 1996; Woodman & Luck, 1999). Because the N2pc is computed by comparing 
contralateral and ipsilateral ERP waveforms to targets in the left versus right visual field, no 
N2pc is elicited for target objects that appear on the vertical meridian (Woodman & Luck, 
1999; Hickey, McDonald, & Theeuwes, 2006; Eimer, Kiss, & Nicholas, 2011). To measure the 
N2pc to one of the two targets independently of the N2pc to the other target, we presented 
one target/nontarget pair on the horizontal meridian and the other stimulus pair on the 
vertical meridian (Eimer & Grubert, 2014; see Figure 1). Trials where the horizontal display 
preceded the vertical display (horizontal target first: H1 targets) and trials where this order 
was reversed (horizontal target second: H2 targets) were randomly intermixed.  
 When both displays were separated by a 100 ms SOA, the N2pc to H1 targets 
preceded the N2pc to H2 targets by almost exactly 100 ms. Critically, when the SOA 
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between the two displays was 10 ms, the latency difference of the N2pc components to the 
two targets again mirrored this objective time interval precisely, as the N2pc to H2 targets 
emerged 10 ms later than the N2pc to H1 targets. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (top panel, 
One Colour Task), which shows ERPs at lateral posterior electrodes PO7 and PO8 
contralateral and ipsilateral to a horizontal target-colour object, separately for trials where 
this object appeared in the first display (H1) or in the second display (H2). Figure 2 also 
shows the corresponding N2pc difference waveforms that were obtained by subtracting 
ipsilateral from contralateral ERPs. The point in time when N2pc components to H1 and H2 
targets reach a pre-defined onset threshold (-1V) is indicated by filled circles. The 
observation that these two N2pc components were equal in size and overlapped in time 
demonstrates that focal attention can be allocated rapidly and in parallel to several target 
objects, with each selection process following its own independent time course. Most 
critically, the fact that the onset latency difference between the N2pc to H1 and H2 targets 
perfectly matched the objective SOA between the two displays (10 ms) provides new 
insights into the temporal resolution of selective spatial attention in vision. It shows that the 
top-down control processes responsible for the allocation of spatial attention to target 
objects are highly sensitive to very small temporal separations between these objects. 
 In a follow-up study (Grubert & Eimer, in press), we perfectly replicated this 
temporal pattern of N2pc components to two successive targets in the same colour that 
were separated by a 10 ms SOA. We also investigated whether the allocation of attention to 
successively presented targets remains tuned to the objective time delay between these 
targets when their selection can no longer be guided by a unique colour-specific top-down 
task set. In the new Two Colour task, the two targets could have one of two possible 
colours, and there was always a colour change between the first and second target on each 
trial. The target colour sequence (e.g., red -> green or green -> red) varied unpredictably 
across trials, so that participants could no longer predict the colour of the first target. When 
both displays were separated by a 10 ms SOA, the onset latencies of N2pc components to 
H1 and H2 targets still matched the objective onset delay between the two displays quite 
closely. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (bottom panel), which shows ERPs to H1 and H2 targets 
at contralateral and ipsilateral posterior electrodes in this Two Colour task, together with 
the corresponding N2pc difference waveforms (as reported in Grubert & Eimer, in press). 
The onset latency difference between the N2pc to H1 and H2 targets was now 31 ms, which 
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is only about 20 ms longer than the objective SOA between the two displays (10 ms). This 
demonstrates that attentional control processes remain sensitive to very small onset delays 
between successive target stimuli even when their selection cannot be based on a single 
colour-specific attentional task set. The fact that the interval between the onsets of the two 
N2pc components to H1 and H2 targets was longer in the Two Colour task relative to the 
One Colour task (as shown in Figure 2) is likely to be due to competitive interactions 
between two simultaneously active attentional task sets in the former task (see Grubert & 
Eimer, in press, for a detailed discussion). 
 Overall, the N2pc results from our previous studies (Eimer & Grubert, 2014; Grubert 
& Eimer, in press) demonstrate that control processes involved in the allocation of selective 
visual attention are highly sensitive to temporal relationships between successively 
presented task-relevant visual stimuli. Even when these stimuli arrive within 10 ms of each 
other, their onset asynchrony is accurately reflected by the onset of neural processes 
involved in their spatially selective attentional processing. In other words, precise 
information about the temporal sequence of successive visual events is available to 
attentional control processes, and this information affects the time course of allocating 
attention to these events in a way that matches their objective temporal separation. The 
fact that early stages of focal-attentional processing that are reflected by the N2pc 
component are sensitive to very small onset delays between successive visual events raises 
the important question whether this temporal information is also available to guide 
conscious perceptual temporal order judgments. If selective attention and conscious 
awareness are identical (e.g., Posner, 1994), small stimulus onset delays that are detected 
by attentional control processes should in principle also be accessible to awareness. In this 
case, it should be possible to utilize these attentional signals for explicit judgments of 
temporal order. Under experimental conditions like the ones used in our previous N2pc 
studies, observers should therefore be able to report with above-chance accuracy that the 
first target precedes the second target object, even when they are separated by an SOA of 
only 10 ms. 
 This prediction could not be tested in our previous experiments (Eimer & Grubert, 
2014; Grubert & Eimer, in press), where participants made same/different category 
judgments to the two successively presented target objects, and the temporal order in 
which they were presented and perceived was not reported. However, previous 
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investigations on the perception of temporal order within and across different sensory 
modalities (e,g., Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961; Zampini, Shore, & Spence, 2003; Hendrich, Strobach, 
Buss, Müller, & Schubert, 2012) indicate that an SOA of 10 ms between successive stimuli may 
be insufficient for above-chance temporal order judgments. For example, Hirsh and Sherrick 
(1961) reported that above-chance judgements of successiveness were possible once two 
stimuli are separated by SOAs of approximately 20 ms, and that performance was at or close 
to chance for shorter SOAs. Interestingly, these authors found that this threshold for 
temporal order judgments was more or less constant for vision, audition, and touch, as well 
as for judgements across sensory modalities. These observations suggest that the SOA of 10 
ms between two visual target stimuli that was used in our previous N2pc experiments 
(Eimer & Grubert, 2014; Grubert & Eimer, in press) may not allow above-chance conscious 
judgments of temporal order. However, the stimulus procedures used in our previous work 
and those employed in the classic experiments of Hirsh and Sherrick (1961) were quite 
different. In the latter study, two flashes of light were presented successively in the left 
versus right or upper versus lower visual field, and observers had to report the location of 
the first of these flashes. Moreover, Hirsh and Sherrick (1961) defined the threshold for 
successful temporal order judgments as the time interval where responses were correct on 
75% of all trials, which may have overestimated the minimal SOA required for above-chance 
performance. 
 To find out whether observers are able to detect the temporal order of two 
successively presented visual objects with above-chance accuracy when stimulus 
procedures are the same as those used in our two earlier N2pc studies, we ran a 
behavioural experiment where participants were required to make an explicit temporal 
order judgment on each trial. The stimulus setup was identical to our previous experiments 
(Eimer & Grubert, 2014; Grubert & Eimer, in press). On each trial, two stimulus displays (20 
ms duration) with a colour-defined target and a nontarget item on opposite sides were 
presented successively. These two displays were separated by SOAs of 10 ms, 20 ms, or 30 
ms, with SOA varied randomly across trials. The first stimulus pair appeared on the vertical 
meridian and the second on the horizontal meridian, or vice versa (see Figure 1), and this 
also varied randomly. In contrast to our earlier experiments, the two target-colour objects 
now always differed in their alphanumerical category (one letter and one digit). This change 
was introduced because temporal order judgments require that the two to-be-judged 
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stimuli differ on a particular dimension, so that observers can use this dimension to indicate 
which of them came first or second (see Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961). Participants’ task was to 
report on each trial whether the first of the two target-colour objects was a letter or a digit. 
Performing this task with above-chance accuracy requires access to information about the 
temporal order in which the two target-colour stimuli were presented. Our earlier N2pc 
studies have shown that this information is accessible to attentional control processes, even 
for SOAs of 10 ms. If observers are able to utilize this information for explicit temporal order 
judgments, task performance should be above chance for all three SOAs tested. In contrast, 
if a 10 ms SOA is too short for successful judgments of temporal order, as suggested by 
earlier findings (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961), performance will be at chance level for an SOA of 
10 ms, and should improve when SOA is increased. 
 In one earlier study (Grubert & Eimer, in press), we found that the interval between 
N2pc components to H1 and H2 targets was longer in a Two Colour task where the two 
target items differed in their colour than in a One Colour task where both targets always had 
the same colour (as shown in Figure 2). If the time delay between these two N2pc 
components represents an on-line attentional temporal order signal that can be directly 
accessed by explicit temporal order judgments, these judgments may be more accurate 
when the two to-be-compared visual stimuli always have a different colour. To test this 
possibility, we asked participants to judge the category of the first target-colour item in two 
blocked task conditions where target colour was either constant (One Colour task) or 
changed across the two successive displays (Two Colour task; see Figure 1). Finally, in order 
to assess whether the judgment of temporal order improves as a result of practice, we 
compared task performance between the first and second half of experimental blocks in the 
One and Two Colour tasks. 
 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Twelve paid participants took part in this experiment. They were aged between 23 
and 41 years (mean age 31.4 years). Six were female, and three were left-handed. They all 
 9 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal colour vision, as measured with the 
Ishihara colour vision test (Ishihara, 1972). 
 
2.2. Stimuli and procedure 
 
Participants were seated in a dimly illuminated test booth and viewed the stimuli on 
a 22-inch Samsung wide SyncMaster 2233 LCD monitor (resolution of 1280x1024 pixels, 100 
Hz refresh rate; 16 ms black-to-white-to-black response time, as verified with a photodiode) 
at a distance of approximately 100 cm. Stimulus presentation, timing, and response 
recollection were controlled by a LG Pentium PC running under Windows XP, using the 
Cogent 2000 toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/) for MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc.).  
Stimuli were coloured uppercase letters (B, H, S, or T) or digits (1, 2, 3, or 4), 
measuring 0.9 x 0.9 degrees of visual angle. They were presented against a black 
background at an eccentricity of 2.4° from central fixation, which was marked by a 
continuously present grey fixation point (CIE colour coordinates: .321/.352; 0.2° x 0.2° of 
visual angle). Each trial contained two successively presented search displays. Each display 
consisted of one stimulus in a target colour and another in a nontarget colour (Figure 1). The 
four possible stimulus colours were red (.637/.329), green (.264/.556), blue (.179/.168), and 
yellow (.423/.461). All colours were equiluminant (~7.5 cd/m2). One target/nontarget pair 
was presented on the horizontal meridian (left and right of fixation), while the other pair 
appeared on the vertical meridian (above and below fixation). The presentation sequence 
(horizontal pair first, or vertical pair first), and the actual positions of the targets in the two 
displays (left/right; top/bottom) were equiprobable. These four presentation conditions 
were independently determined in each trial and were presented randomly intermixed in 
each block.  
On each trial, four out of the eight stimulus identities were randomly selected, with 
the restriction that one of the two target items had to be a digit, and the other one a letter. 
Participants’ task was to report whether the target colour stimulus of the first display was a 
digit or a letter by pressing the corresponding one of two purpose-built vertically aligned 
response keys. The response-to-key and the hand-to-key mapping were counterbalanced 
across participants. Trials requiring a ‘digit first’ or a ‘letter first’ response were 
equiprobable and randomly intermixed in each block. 
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On all trials, the two successive stimulus displays were presented for 20 ms each. 
One critical manipulation concerned the SOA between the two stimulus displays, which was 
30 ms, 20 ms, or 10 ms (as shown in Figure 1). In SOA30 trials, a 10 ms blank interval was 
present between the two stimulus displays. In SOA20 trials, the two stimulus displays 
followed each other immediately. In SOA10 trials, where the onset of the first display 
preceded the onset of the second display by only 10 ms, both displays overlapped for 10 ms. 
These three SOA conditions were randomly intermixed in each block. The interval between 
the offset of the second display and the onset of the first display on the next trial was 1900 
ms.  
The other critical manipulation concerned target colour, with two blocked colour 
task conditions. In the One Colour task, all targets were defined by the same colour (e.g., 
participants had to decide whether the red digit or the red letter was presented first). Each 
of the four colours (red, green, blue, or yellow) served as target colour for three 
participants, and the respective other three colours served as nontarget colours. In the Two 
Colour task, there were two possible target colours, and the two successively presented 
targets always differed in colour (e.g., participants had to decide whether the red digit or 
the green letter was presented first). The order in which these two target colours appeared 
was randomly determined for each trial, so that the colour sequence and the colour of the 
first target on each trial were unpredictable. For six participants, target colours were red 
and green, and nontarget colours were yellow and blue, and this order was reversed for the 
other six participants. These target/nontarget mappings were chosen to ensure that the two 
target colours were not linearly separable in colour space from the two nontarget colours. 
For each participant, the target colour of the One Colour task served as nontarget colour in 
the Two Colour task (e.g., participants who searched for red targets in the One Colour task 
would search for yellow and blue targets in the Two Colour task).  
The experiment contained eight blocks, with 96 trials per block. For each block, there 
were four trials for each combination of first target identity (digit or letter), first target 
location (left, right, top, or bottom) and SOA condition (30, 20, or 10 ms). The One Colour 
and Two Colour tasks were each run in four successive blocks. Six participants started the 
experiment with the One Colour task, and the other six with the Two Colour task. 
Participants were free to take breaks between the blocks, and had one additional break 
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after 48 trials of each block. Participants were familiarised with the visual and temporal 
properties of the displays by passively viewing 10 trials before the start of the experiment. 
 
2.3. Data analysis 
 
Mean percentage correct of the three SOA conditions (SOA10, SOA20, and SOA30) in 
both task conditions (One Colour, Two Colour) were analysed by means of one-way 
ANOVAs. Significant effects were followed up in terms of two-tailed t-tests. All p-values 
were Bonferroni corrected. 
 
3. Results 
 
Figure 3 (left panel) shows the percentage of trials where participants correctly 
reported the category of the target item in the first display in the three SOA conditions, 
separately for the One Colour and the Two Colour task. As expected, accuracy improved as 
the SOA between the two displays was increased. A repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
factors task (One Colour, Two Colour) and SOA (SOA10, SOA20, SOA30) revealed a main 
effect of SOA, F(2,22) = 40.4, p < .001, with better performance for longer SOAs (51.7%, 
57.5%, and 66.0% correct responses in the SOA10, SOA20, and SOA30 conditions, 
respectively). There was no effect of task, F(1,11) < 1, and no interaction between task and 
SOA, F(2,22) = 1.2, p = .330, indicating that participants’ ability to detect temporal order did 
not differ between the One and Two Colour tasks.  
The critical question was whether participants were able to report the category of 
the first target with above-chance accuracy in all three SOA conditions. Because there were 
no significant effects involving the factor task, performance in the SOA10, SOA20, and 
SOA30 conditions was pooled across the One and Two Colour tasks to increase the signal-to-
noise ratio. When the SOA between the two displays was 20 ms or 30 ms, accuracy was 
reliably above chance (50%), both t(11) > 5.5, both p < .001. In contrast, performance in the 
SOA10 condition did not differ significantly from chance, t(11) = 1.8, p = .300, demonstrating 
that participants were unable to detect the temporal order of the two target displays. 
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Additional t-tests showed that accuracy was significantly better with an SOA of 20 ms 
relative to the SOA10 condition, t(11) = 4.2, p = .003, and further improved for the SOA30 
relative to the SOA20 condition, t(11) = 5.0, p < .001.  
To assess whether participants’ ability to detect temporal order might have 
increased in the course of the experiment, performance was compared between the first 
two blocks and final two blocks of the One Colour and Two Colour task, respectively. Figure 
3 (right panel) shows percentage correct for the first versus second half of these tasks 
(collapsed across the One and Two Colour tasks), and suggests that if there were any 
learning effects, they were only present for the longest SOA between the two displays. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors SOA condition (SOA10, SOA20, SOA30), and 
experimental half (first, second) did not produce a reliable effect of experimental half, 
F(1,11) < 1, indicating that there were no reliable learning effects across all three SOAs. 
However, there was a significant interaction between SOA and experimental half, F(2,22) = 
4.8, p = .018. In the SOA10 and SOA20 conditions, performance did not differ reliably 
between the first and second half, t(11) = 1.7, p = .363, and t(11) < 1, respectively. When the 
SOA between the two displays was 30 ms, there was a tendency towards better 
performance in the second half, which did however not reach Bonferroni-corrected 
significance, t(11) = 2.7, p = .063. 
  
 
4. Discussion 
  
 In a series of previous ERP experiments that employed the N2pc component as an 
electrophysiological marker of attentional target selection (Eimer & Grubert, 2014; Grubert 
& Eimer, in press), we demonstrated that control processes involved in the allocation of 
spatial attention to visual targets are remarkably sensitive to the temporal order in which 
these targets are presented. Even when the SOA between two successive targets was only 
10 ms, N2pc components to these targets perfectly mirrored their objective time delay 
(Figure 2). If this information about the temporal order of visual events is accessible to 
attentional processes, it might also be accessible for explicit temporal order judgments, in 
particular if selective attention and conscious awareness are functionally identical. The 
present behavioural experiment used the same stimulus procedures as our previous N2pc 
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studies, except that participants now had to report the category of the first of two 
successively presented target-colour stimuli. To perform this task, they had to be able to 
detect the temporal order in which these stimuli appeared. Our results show that when 
these two stimuli were separated by a 10 ms SOA, performance was at chance level (see 
Figure 3). This demonstrates that participants were not able to temporally discriminate 
between the first and second target-colour item on these trials. When the SOA was 
increased to 20 ms and 30 ms, performance gradually improved, with above-chance 
accuracy already observed for an SOA of 20 ms. 
 These findings closely resemble previous results by Hirsh and Sherrick (1961), in spite 
of the fact that these studies used very different stimulation procedures (flashes of light 
versus coloured letter/digit pairs) and task instructions (localization judgments versus 
judgments of alphanumeric category). Similar to the current experiment, Hirsh and Sherrick 
(1961) found that the temporal order of two successive stimuli can be discriminated only 
when they are separated by an SOA of at least 20 ms. Performance was far from perfect 
even with a 30 ms SOA in the present experiment, where observers correctly reported the 
category of the first target-colour item only on approximately two thirds of all trials (see 
also Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961, for similar observations). These results show that the conscious 
perception of temporal order requires a temporal interval between two visual stimuli that is 
longer than the shortest SOA (10 ms) employed in our previous ERP studies (Eimer & 
Grubert, 2014; Grubert & Eimer, in press). In these two studies, N2pc onset latencies to two 
target stimuli separated by 10 ms perfectly mirrored the objective onset difference between 
these two stimuli, demonstrating that temporal order information was available to 
attentional control processes. In the present experiment, participants were unable to access 
this information in a task that required the explicit detection of temporal order, which 
shows that selective attention and conscious awareness differ systematically in their 
sensitivity to information about the temporal sequence of visual events. 
 There were no performance differences between the One Colour and Two Colour 
tasks of the present experiment, thus ruling out the possibility that the detection of 
temporal order is facilitated when the two critical visual stimuli differ in the selection-
relevant visual dimension (colour). In a previous experiment (Grubert & Eimer, in press), the 
N2pc onset delay between H1 and H2 targets was found to be larger in the Two Colour task 
than in the One Colour task (Figure 2). If latency differences in the onset of attentional 
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selection processes for particular objects, as reflected by N2pc components to these 
objects, could be used as attentional temporal order signals for explicit judgments of 
temporal precedence, these judgments should have been more accurate in the Two Colour 
task. The absence of reliable performance differences between the two tasks does not 
support this hypothesis, and provides further evidence for dissociations between the 
processing of temporal order information in the attentional system and access to this 
information during the explicit detection of temporal sequence. There was also no evidence 
that participants’ ability to make above-chance temporal order judgments increased as a 
result of practice when the SOA between two successive stimuli is very brief (10 or 20 ms). 
This is important, because our two previous N2pc studies included a large number of trials 
(six blocks with 64 trials per block for each blocked SOA condition). It could therefore be 
argued that the sensitivity of attentional control processes to very brief SOAs between 
successive targets, as reflected by the N2pc onset latency differences to H1 and H2 targets 
with a 10 ms SOA between the two displays, only emerges in the course of the experiment 
once the task is highly practised. The absence of any learning effects for SOAs of 10 ms and 
20 ms in the present study shows that when SOAs are very short, the quality of temporal 
order judgments does not improve in the course of the experiment. There was some 
evidence that practice may facilitate such judgments for longer SOAs, but the improvement 
observed with an SOA of 30 ms only approached our conservative statistical significance 
threshold. 
 Overall, the current behavioural results show a clear dissociation between selective 
attention and conscious awareness in the detection of the temporal order of visual events. 
Even though temporal order information is precisely represented in the attentional system 
(as reflected by N2pc onset latency differences to successive target objects that match their 
objective temporal separation, as shown by Eimer & Grubert, 2014, and Grubert & Eimer, in 
press), this information cannot be accessed for explicit temporal order judgments when the 
SOA between two visual stimuli is shorter than 20 ms. An analogous dissociation between 
the representation of temporal signals in visual cortex and their inaccessibility to conscious 
awareness has been found in studies of heterochromatic flicker fusion. When two 
isoluminant colours alternate at frequencies above 10 Hz, only a single fused colour is 
perceived. However, neurons in primary visual cortex accurately represent the temporal 
sequence of alternating colours for frequencies well above the flicker fusion threshold (e.g., 
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Gur & Snodderly, 1997), demonstrating that temporal information that is available at the 
neural level remains inaccessible to conscious visual perception.    
 This differential sensitivity of attentional processes and awareness to temporal order 
information demonstrated in the current study is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the 
mechanisms that implement selective attention and consciousness are functionally 
identical. If this was the case, temporal information that is represented during the 
attentional processing of visual stimuli should in principle also be accessible for conscious 
report. The fact that participants were unable to make above-chance temporal order 
judgments when the SOA between two successive stimuli was 10 ms provides further 
evidence that attention and awareness are functionally separable. A number of previous 
studies have also demonstrated similar dissociations between attention and awareness in 
different task contexts. For example, visual gratings rendered invisible through lateral 
masking still produce reliable orientation aftereffects, suggesting that they had been 
attended (He et al., 2002). Masked stimuli that cannot be consciously detected produce 
systematic response activation and response inhibition effects (e.g., Eimer & Schlaghecken, 
1998), and these effects critically depend on a particular attentional task set (Schlaghecken 
& Eimer, 2004; see also Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002). Many other studies 
investigating subliminal visuomotor and semantic priming have shown that the processing 
of stimuli that are inaccessible to awareness are modulated by top-down executive 
processes (see Kiefer, 2012, for a review), demonstrating that automatic processes triggered 
by subliminal stimuli can be highly sensitive to attentional control settings.  
 Together with the current results, such findings suggest that selective attention and 
conscious awareness may operate at different stages. Attentional processes are responsible 
for the selective prioritization of potentially task-relevant information at relatively early 
stages of perceptual processing. This stage of attentional selection is functionally and 
temporally distinct from a subsequent identification stage which involves the encoding of 
selected stimuli in working memory and their access to conscious recognition processes (see 
Eimer, 2014, for further details, and Lamme, 2003, for similar suggestions). In this 
framework, dissociations between attention and awareness will occur when information 
that is available to early attentional selection processes is not passed on to later conscious 
detection and discrimination stages. What the current results show is that even though 
exact information about the temporal order of visual objects is present during their 
 16 
attentional selection, this information is no longer represented with the same temporal 
precision at a subsequent stage that mediates conscious access.  
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Stimulus procedures. Schematic illustration of the time course of stimulus events 
in our previous ERP experiments (Eimer & Grubert, 2014; Grubert & Eimer, in press) and in 
the current behavioural study. On each trial, two displays with a colour-defined target and a 
nontarget-colour distractor on opposite sides were presented sequentially. One 
target/nontarget pair appeared on the horizontal meridian and the other on the vertical 
meridian. In the One Colour task, all targets had the same colour. In the Two Colour task, 
there were two possible target colours, and target colour always changed between the first 
and second display. Each display was presented for 20 ms, and the SOA between the two 
displays was either 10 ms, 20 ms, or 30 ms. In SOA10 trials, the second display appeared 10 
ms after the onset of the first display, so that both displays were simultaneously present for 
10 ms. In SOA20 trials, the onset of the second display was synchronous with the offset of 
the first display. In SOA30 trials, there was a 10 ms gap between the offset of the first and 
the onset of the second display. The examples shown in this Figure include One Colour trials 
where both targets are red and Two Colour trials where the two targets are red and green, 
and all three SOA conditions. In our earlier ERP studies, participants had to judge the 
alphanumeric category of the two target objects (same/different). In the current study, their 
task was to report whether the first target-colour item on each trial was a letter or a digit. 
 
Figure 2. Event-related potential results. N2pc results obtained for the One Colour task in 
the study by Eimer & Grubert (2014) and in the Two Colour task by Grubert and Eimer (in 
press) in blocks where the SOA between the two displays was 10 ms. Left panel: Grand-
average ERP waveforms measured in the 400 ms interval after the onset of the first display 
at posterior electrodes PO7/PO8 contralateral and ipsilateral to the target in the first display 
for trials with a horizontal target in the first display (H1 targets) or in the second display (H2 
targets), shown separately for the One Colour task (top) and Two Colour task (bottom). 
Right panel: N2pc difference waveforms obtained by subtracting ipsilateral from 
contralateral ERPs, separately for H1 and H2 targets, in the One Colour task (top) and Two 
Colour task (bottom). Stars mark the onset of the second display (10 ms after the onset of 
the first display). Circles mark the points in time when N2pc amplitudes reach the onset 
criterion value (-1V). The onset latency difference between N2pc components to H1 and 
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H2 targets precisely matched the objective time interval between the two target displays 
(10 ms) in the One Colour task, and was slightly larger (31 ms) in the Two Colour task. 
 
Figure 3. Behavioural results. Performance in the current experiment, where the category 
(letter or digit) of the first target-colour item had to be reported. The two panels show the 
percentage of correct responses (relative to a chance level of 50%) for SOAs of 10, 20, or 30 
ms between the two displays, in the One Colour and Two Colour tasks (left panel) and in the 
first two and final two blocks of both tasks (collapsed across the two tasks, right panel). 
Performance was at chance level for the shortest SOA (10 ms). 
